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Tiger AO4 Project delivers a competitive Linear Alpha Olefins (LAO) project at Geismar in 
2018, recovering 100 kta of “stranded” LAO capacity in the Geismar Chemical Plan and 
contributes an additional 716 MMlbs/year of LAO to the Shell LAO Capacity. This paper 
elaborates the successful implementation of Hazards and Effects Management Process (HEMP) 
in Tiger AO4 project through design, procurement, construction, commissioning, startup, and 
operation. During the design process, the key processes include hazard identification, risk 
assessment, risk management to ALARP (as low as reasonably possible). It also covers the 
technical integrity verification process during the procurement, construction, commissioning, and 
startup., this paper explains the processes of incorporating HSSE critical activities (e.g. 
inspection, maintenance, surveillance, operator response, operating procedure steps, etc.) with 
current Geismar management system. At last, this paper also describes the development and 
operationalization of the Safety Case.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Project Tiger AO4 will add a new Linear Alpha Olefins (LAO) at the Geismar Chemical Plant 
using Shell Technology. When completed, it will make the Shell Geismar site the largest alpha 
olefins producer in the world. Alpha olefins are used to produce household detergents, plastics, 
synthetic lubricants, and drilling fluids, among other useful products. The AO4 Unit will use 
ethylene as feed stock and produce full range of Linear Alpha Olefins.  
 
The paper documents the effective application of the Hazards and Effects Management Process 
(HEMP) during the design, fabrication, and construction of the facilities under the scope of the 
AO4 Project (referred to as Project hereafter). 
 
HEMP OVERVIEW 
The Hazards & Effects Management Process (HEMP) is the process by which the Project 
identifies and assesses hazards, implements measures to manage them, and demonstrates that 
their risks are reduced to a level that is As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). This paper 
gives an overview of how the Hazards and Effects Management Process (HEMP) has been 
implemented on the Project to identify, assess and manage risks to ALARP.  
The HEMP included the following: 
 A robust Hazard Identification Process to identify the full range of hazards applicable to 
the operation of the facilities designed and constructed by the Project 
 Appropriate risk assessment tools to assess the risks associated with the identified 
hazards 
 Implementation of effective and valid controls to reduce the risk to ALARP.  
 Defining operation and maintenance activities for effective management of Major HSSE 
Hazards to ALARP risk levels. 
 
See Figure 1 for an overview of the HEMP process.  
 
Figure 1. HEMP Overview 
 
HEMP in Project 
 
Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment   
Hazard identification and risk assessment were done through a series of studies such as the 
HAZID (Hazards Identification), HAZOP (Hazards and Operability study), RHA (reactive 
hazards analysis), Consequence Modelling, layout assessment, health risk assessment and HFE 
(Human Factor Engineering) Screening. Also, Health, Security, Environmental Hazards and 
social aspects were identified through an Impact Assessment. The risk ranking is based on the 
established Shell Risk Assessment Matrix (RAM), which accounts for the likelihood and severity 
of consequences associated with the hazards. 
 
A Hazards and Effects Register was developed which is a compilation of all AO4 process and 
construction hazards, along with the source of the hazard, credible worst-case consequence, risk 
ranking and methodology for demonstrating ALARP. 
 
Risk Management and ALARP Determination  
AO4 Project selected the risk management methodology based on the severity and likelihood of 
the hazards. The risks were managed to tolerability criteria defined by the Project HSSE Premise. 
The tolerability criteria were in line with current industry practices. In addition, the Project drove 
the risks to ALARP, which was not a specific numerical quantity but was defined as the level of 
risk reduction beyond which the cost of further risk reduction is grossly disproportionate to its 
benefit. 
 
Figure 2 provides an overview of the Risk Management Methodology.  
 
Figure 2. Risk Management to ALARP 
 
 Low Risk Hazards: The Project managed hazards having low risks through the effective 
implementation of the Shell Project HSSE Management System  
 Medium Risk Hazards: The Project managed hazards having medium risks through 
compliance to International codes and standards (i.e. ISO, API, ASME, IEC, etc.); and 
Shell DEPs (Design Engineering Practices). In addition, the Project identified and 
documented control and recovery measures for all scenarios associated with medium 
risks through the HAZOP study.  
 High Risk Hazards: For each of the high-risk hazards identified in the Hazards and 
Effects Register, the Project demonstrated that the risk is tolerable through the LOPA 
exercise. The LOPA exercises focused on verifying whether previously identified Control 
and Recovery Measures (during the HAZOP) were sufficient to meet the Tolerability and 
ALARP criteria set for the project. Additional barriers were provided if the previously 
identified barriers did not meet the tolerability or ALARP criteria. Demonstration of 
ALARP involved an assessment of residual risk compared to project premises to 
determine whether sufficient controls are in place to manage the residual risk to an 
acceptable level and whether additional risk reduction options are reasonably practicable. 
Residual Risk is considered ALARP if further action is grossly disproportionate to the 
reduction in risk achieved. Hazard control sheets and bowties were developed to 
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summarize the risks associated with these major process hazards and provide an 
indication of how these risks have been managed to ALARP.   
 
Implementation of HEMP in Design Phase  
Results of various risk management studies were incorporated into the design of the AO4 unit. 
Here are a few examples: 
 The results of consequence modelling were used in the development of the unit layout. 
 The HFE requirements were included into the design and verified through 3D model 
reviews 
 Design requirements were developed for barriers identified through HAZOP and LOPA 
studies to ensure their validity.  
 
The control and recover measures for high risk hazards identified through LOPA, Safety Risk 
Studies and Application of Design Standards were considered safety critical barriers. The 
barriers were categorized into safety critical equipment, safety critical activities and other design 
features. For each of these categories, design performance standards were developed by the 
responsible disciplines to define the design performance criteria, and the assurance activities. 
 
Implementation of HEMP in Construction Phase 
Focused risk assessments were conducted to evaluate the risks and develop risk mitigation 
measures for the construction hazards identified in the project Hazards and Effects Register. 
These risk mitigation measures were incorporated into construction plans.  
 
The integrity of safety critical equipment identified in the design phase was managed through 
various quality inspection test plans developed by the responsible disciplines to meet the 
performance criteria. Implementation of these inspection test plans were assured by field 
engineers.  
 
Implementation of HEMP in Commissioning/Start-up (CSU) Phase 
HEMP during commissioning and start-up focused on the simultaneous operation (SIMOPs) 
between construction and CSU activities. Focused risk assessments were conducted to evaluate 
the risks associated with the SIMOPs. The risk mitigation measures identified in these studies, 
such as demarcation, energy isolation, communication, were developed into SIMOPs checklists. 
Implementation of these SIMOPs checklists were assured by field engineers. 
 
The integrity of safety critical equipment identified in the design phase was managed through 
commissioning procedures developed by the responsible disciplines to meet the performance 
criteria. 
 
Operationalization of HEMP 
The various AO4 Project HEMP deliverables were operationalized and integrated into the 
existing Geismar HEMP studies, such as the existing Geismar Hazards and Effects Register, 
facility siting study, consequence model, and HAZOP report. . 
 
In addition, the integrity of safety critical hardware barriers identified in the design phase 
(HAZOP/LOPA studies) was managed through various Reliability Centered Maintenance 
Process. The resulting inspection and maintenance activities and frequencies were incorporated 
into the existing Geismar management systems.  
 
Operator actions/activities that were used as valid barriers in the HAZOP/LOPA Study for major 
hazard scenarios were considered as safety critical activity barriers. These activities/actions were 
incorporated into  
 Operating procedures 
 Operator response to alarms 
 Surveillance/ Operator Rounds 
 Emergency Response plans 
Figure 3 shows the detailed process of operationalization of the safety critical barriers. 
 
 
Figure 3. Operationalization of Safety Critical Barriers 
 
Bow-tie diagrams showing threats and barriers associated with the major hazards were developed 
using the results of the HAZOP/LOPA Studies. These Bow-tie diagrams were used to train 
operators and to communicate to stakeholders: 
 Major hazards and their location in the Unit 
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 Operator activities that are required to mitigate risks 




This paper elaborates the successful implementation of Hazards and Effects Management 
Process (HEMP) in Tiger AO4 project. The project recognizes that HEMP implementation is not 
effective if it ends with completion of risk management studies. The effectiveness can only be 
guaranteed if the integrity of the barriers identified through the studies is managed through the 
life-cycle of the project and the asset. The Project accomplished this by establishing work 
process to ensure the integrity of the barriers through design, procurement, construction, CSU, 
and operation. In addition, the Project did not considered HEMP as a standalone or single 
discipline work process; instead, made it an integral element of multiple discipline work process.  
 
 
 
 
